Monday, 6 August 2018

Captain Kenneth Allanson, Royal Artillery - The Battle for Hong Kong

Kenneth Edward Allanson was born in 1912 in Woking, Surrey. He was the youngest of five siblings, with two brothers and two sisters. The family moved to Lee Green, South London in the late 1920s. After leaving school, Kenneth trained and qualified as a solicitor. Law Society records show that he was admitted in 1933 at the age of twenty-one. He was a member of the law firm Bate & Co. of Lincoln's Inn.
   In 1938 he joined the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC), a Territorial Army unit based in the City of London. HAC records indicate that he joined 'B' Battery. In 1939, he is listed as serving with  11th (HAC) Regiment RHA. In October 1939 he was promoted to Lance Bombardier. His eldest brother, James Allanson, had already joined the Territorial Army some years earlier and initially served with a London based field artillery regiment, which later converted to an anti-tank role. During WW2, this regiment formed part of the 51st Highland Division, and James Allanson served in North Africa and Italy. Kenneth's brother, Harold Allanson, had been resident in Burma before the war. During the war, he served with Z Force in Burma, a special forces unit operating behind enemy lines, and providing intelligence to 14th Army HQ on Japanese forces, movements and logistics.
   Kenneth was selected for officer training and was posted to 122 Officer Cadet Training Unit at Larkhill in December 1939 The course lasted some six months and in May 1940, at the age of twenty-eight, he was commissioned as a 2/Lt in the Royal Artillery. He was initially posted to 1st Reserve Field Regiment RA based at Ascot, then in June he was posted to the RA Depot at Woolwich before being posted to Hong Kong in July 1940 where he fought in the short, but brutal Battle for Hong Kong in December 1941.

2/Lt Kenneth Allanson (Courtesy of Christopher Allanson)
Commissioned as a 2/Lt (London Gazette)
He embarked on the SS Viceroy of India which sailed from Liverpool on or around 21 July 1940. He arrived in Hong Kong in September where he served with 8 Coastal Regiment, Eastern Fire Command. The regiment was commanded by Lt-Col Selby Shaw, MC, RA. He was assigned to 12th Coast Battery which was located at Stanley Fort. The battery consisted of three Mark VII 9.2-inch coastal defence guns. The battery was commanded by Major William Stevenson, RA.

 8th Coast Regiment, RA (Source: Major Templer's Diary Imperial War Museum)
The coastal defence of Hong Kong in December 1941 was formidable. Eastern Fire Command consisted of two 9.2-inch batteries (Bokhara and Stanley), and four 6-inch batteries (Collinson, Chung Hom Kok, Bluff Head and Pak Sha Wan, and one 4-inch battery at D'Aguilar. Western Fire Command consisted of a battery of three 9.2-inch guns at Fort Davis, two 6-inch batteries (Stonecutters and Jubilee), one 4-inch battery on Aberdeen Island and two 60-pdrs on Stonecutters Island. The coastal defence batteries covered all the seaward approaches to Hong Kong.
   The Royal Navy had established minefields, consisting of both contact mines and remote-controlled mines, around the approaches to Hong Kong. Indicator loops had been laid on the seabed, which could detect the movement of enemy ships or submarines. This information could then be relayed to the coastal defence batteries, or to the mine control stations, and the intruding vessel could then be sunk by gunfire, or by remote-controlled mines. 

9.2-inch gun at Fort Davis (Source: Wikipedia)
The combination of coastal defence batteries, minefields, and the presence of fast motor torpedo boats (MTBs) ensured that the Imperial Japanese Navy stayed well back. As in Singapore, the guns were pointing seaward, but that is what they were designed for. These were coastal defence batteries built to defend Hong Kong from seaborne attack or invasion. They were mostly equipped with armour-piercing shells for use against enemy warships but had insufficient quantities of high explosive and shrapnel ammunition required for landward firing. Many of the coastal defence guns, including the three 9.2-inch batteries could traverse and fire inland, and they were used very effectively in this capacity, despite the shortage of suitable ammunition. The guns at some of the coastal batteries, like Jubilee, were situated too low and were blocked by terrain, which prevented them from firing in a landward direction.

Map of Hong Kong Island (Source: HK Govt. Maps Office)

Sketch Map of HK Island (Source: Writer)


The infantry was supported by the mobile field artillery of the Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery (HKSRA), who were equipped with 3.7-inch, 4.5-inch and 6-inch howitzers. The 3.7-inch guns were transported by pack mules, and the larger guns were towed by Army trucks. There was some movement of guns, but most stayed in pre-prepared gun positions. The infantry was also supported by 965 Defence Battery which was equipped with six 18-pdr fields guns, and eight 2-pdr anti-tank guns. Their main role was beach defence in support of the pillboxes, manned by the Middlesex Regiment, which ringed the Island shoreline.
   In order to alleviate the shortage of officers in the HKSRA, a number of officers from the two coastal defence regiments were assigned to the mobile artillery. Captain Kenneth Allanson (then listed as a Lieutenant) was posted from 8th Coast Regiment, RA to East Group, RA on 15 December 1941. East Group consisted of all the mobile howitzers in the eastern sector of the Island. Their HQ was at Tai Tam Gap alongside East Infantry Brigade HQ.

Captain Allanson was posted to East Group, RA on 15 Dec 1941 (Source: National Archives)
On transfer to East Group, it is not clear, whether Captain Allanson was deployed to East Group HQ at Tai Tam Gap, or immediately deployed to the 3rd Medium Battery, which consisted of two sections of two 6-inch howitzers, located at Sai Wan and Parker. What is clear, is that on the night of 18 December 1941, when the Japanese landed on the north shore of the Island, Captain Allanson was in command of the Sai Wan Howitzer Section.
The landing was a very close threat to the Sai Wan Section which prepared to defend itself with small arms, and 2/Lt Allanson who joined on the 15 December from 8th Coast Regt, RA was in charge at Sai Wan at this time, and Captain Feilden arrived there at about 2100 hrs with reinforcements from Parker. (Source: War Diary Royal Artillery Island East Group - National Archives)
On Thursday 18 December, the Japanese landed three infantry regiments (228th, 229th and 230th) on the north shore of Hong Kong Island. Each regiment utilised two of their three infantry battalions. Each battalion consisted of one thousand men. Artillery and other support troops followed the infantry. The infantry consisted of 6,000 men, and it is likely that during the night 18/19 December that 8,000 to 10,000 men were landed on the northeast shore between North Point and Shau Kei Wan. The shoreline in this sector was defended by three companies, 'A', 'C' and 'D' Coy, from 5th/7th Rajputs. 'C' Coy, Royal Rifles of Canada, was the nearest infantry to the Sai Wan Howitzer Section with their Coy HQ located at Lye Mun Gap close to Lye Mun Barracks. At North Point, there was a group of militia, known as the Hughes Group, defending the Hong Kong Electric power station. The British, Canadian and Indian troops defending this section of the north shore totalled around 700 men. They were outnumbered by the Japanese troops involved in the landings by more than ten to one. Lt-Col Cadogan-Rawlinson's Rajput battalion put up a good fight but was destroyed on the north shore that night.
   The 6-inch howitzers of the 3rd Medium Battery were heavy weapons with a weight of 4.4 tons. They required a heavy (8-ton) Scammell Army truck to tow them in and out of their gun positions.

6-inch Howitzer (Source: Royal Artillery Museum)
Scammell truck towing an 8-inch Howitzer (Source: Wikipedia) 
The Parker 6-inch Howitzer Section was located in a cutting beside Island Road. It was protected on two flanks by the hillside. The Sai Wan 6-inch Howitzer Section was in a slightly more exposed position but protected on one side by the slope of Sai Wan Hill. The positioning close to the hillside provided some protection from the aerial and artillery bombardment that occurred during the week before the Japanese landings. During the fighting on the Mainland that took place in the first week of the battle, the Sai Wan and Parker Sections were used very effectively to support the Mainland Infantry Brigade. During the siege of the Island, which occurred in the second week of the battle, the two howitzer sections were used for providing counter-battery fire. The howitzer positions were targeted by Japanese counter-battery fire, and incurred several near misses, but no direct hits.
   Captain Allanson's howitzer section was located below Sai Wan Hill, off Island Road in a location that was accessed by a small track known as Cemetery Road. On top of Sai Wan Hill, there was an AA section manned by 5th AA Battery, HKVDC. The AA section was equipped with two 3-inch anti-aircraft guns. The AA position was accessed by a road running through Lye Mun Barracks. On the night of the Japanese landings, there was a 3.7-inch howitzer positioned midway between the barracks and the AA position. The gun, commanded by Captain Bompas, RA, had been brought up from the Tai Tam Fork 3.7-inch Howitzer Section to fire at Japanese AOPs and mortar positions located across the narrows on Devil's Peak Peninsula.

Sai Wan Howitzer Section (Source: Govt Maps Office - Annotations made by the writer)


One battalion from the 229th Infantry landed at Aldrich Bay and then moved inland, and up the north-facing slopes of Mount Parker. A second battalion from the 229th Regiment landed at two locations near Kung Am. This battalion quickly seized the Pak Sha Wan 6-inch coastal defence battery, and the Sai Wan AA position. Lye Mun barracks were mostly empty, the troops having been deployed to their war stations. The 3.7-inch howitzer located between the barracks and the AA position was overrun and captured. Captain Bombas managed to escape down the hill where he proceeded to the Sai Wan 6-inch Howitzer Section. Captain Goldman, the officer in command of the Sai Wan AA Section, also managed to escape down the hill and reached Captain Allanson's position. The volunteer gunners that were captured at the AA position were rounded up, disarmed, held for a short period, and then put to death by bayonet, one after the other. Two of the gunners, although badly wounded, survived and were able to give evidence at war crimes trials held after the war. This was the first of a number of atrocities that were committed by Japanese troops during the fighting on Hong Kong Island. 
   Captain Allanson's howitzer position was compromised by the capture of the AA position. The 6-inch howitzers and their gun crews found themselves unexpectedly on the front line, and the gunners came under increasingly heavy small arms fire from Japanese troops occupying the AA position above them. Efforts were made to re-take Sai Wan Hill by Captain Bompas with the help of Canadian troops from 'C' Coy Royal Rifles of Canada. These efforts were unsuccessful, and in the early hours of Friday 19 December the two howitzers were disabled, and the gunners evacuated to Parker Section further up Island Road. The howitzers could not be withdrawn, because of the lack of towing trucks. Vehicles had been pooled, and as a result, there was no dedicated transport available near the gun positions when they were most needed.  
   The Japanese attacked Wong Nai Chung Gap (WNC Gap) early in the morning of 19 December.  By noon, the Japanese owned the high ground of Mount Parker, Mount Butler and Jardines Lookout. Brigadier John Lawson, commanding West Infantry Brigade, was killed as were most of the officers and Other Ranks at both West Infantry and West Group HQ. East Infantry Brigade and East Group HQ came under small arms fire from Mount Parker in the late morning. A decision was made by the military commanders that all troops in the eastern sector of the Island were to withdraw to Stanley in order to avoid being cut off. The infantry would then launch a counterattack from Stanley.
   The coastal defence batteries at Collinson, Chung Hom Kok, D'Aguilar and Bokhara were put out of action and abandoned. The mobile artillery was ordered to withdraw, but without towing trucks for the 4.5 and 6-inch howitzers, and without mules for the 3.7-inch howitzers, the guns were abandoned. East Group lost all their guns except one. On that day of chaos and confusion, they lost four 6-inch howitzers, four 4.5-inch howitzers, and three 3.7-inch howitzers. The only gun to be successfully brought back to Stanley was a 3.7-inch howitzer based at Tai Tam Fork Section. West Group lost three 3.7-inch and two 6-inch howitzers, which were located on Stanley Gap Road near WNC Gap. 
   Captain Allanson initially withdrew to Parker Section, and later was ordered to withdraw to Stanley Fort. The gunners, without their howitzers, had to fight as infantry. A large group of approximately one hundred gunners was assembled that evening, and ordered to mount an infantry assault on WNC Gap. They first cleared Repulse Bay Road, which was blocked by shot up vehicles. This allowed two armoured cars to get through to WNC Gap, and provide fire support for the attack. They managed to do what no other unit had been able to achieve during a series of counterattacks made by other units during that day (19 December). They were successful in re-capturing the police station and the knoll at the centre of WNC Gap. The police station was held for a period of hours, but the Japanese with four infantry battalions in the area around WNC Gap were able to rush up reinforcements and regain both the police station and the knoll. The gunners fighting in the unfamiliar role of infantry incurred very heavy casualties. Only thirteen gunners made it back to Stanley, the rest were killed or captured. Lt-Col Yale, Major De Vere Hunt and Captain Feilden were all killed at WNC Gap.
   The war diary for East Group states that during the same evening, Major Duncan and Captain Allanson were sent to Wan Chai Gap to take over command of West Group HQ which had been destroyed earlier that day at WNC Gap. West Group still retained a number of howitzers in their sector of the Island, but their officers at Counter-Bombardment HQ and West Group HQ had all been killed.
On the evening of 19 December Major Duncan was ordered to go to Wan Chai Gap and to take over command of West Group RA, and he set off taking with him 2/Lt Allanson. (East Group War Diary)
I am not sure what happened to Captain Allanson after this date, but I assume he remained with West Group HQ, because after 20 December it would have been impossible for him, or Major Duncan, to get from Wan Chai Gap back to East Group at Stanley. There is no further reference to Major Duncan or Captain Allanson in the war diaries. I assume that Major Duncan remained as commander of West Group until 22 December. On that day, Major Crowe, RA who had been injured on 19 December, was released from the hospital and took command of West Group. Although also a Major it is possible that Major Duncan remained with West Group HQ and likewise Captain Allanson. Another possibility is that one or both officers moved to West Group Administrative Pool located at Ho Tung Gardens on the Peak. This was the home of Robert and Clara Ho Tung who referred to it as The Falls. Robert Ho Tung had left Hong Kong before the war started.
   On the night of 23/24 December, West Group HQ withdrew to Victoria Gap following a withdrawal by the infantry from Wan Chai Gap. The area around Victoria Gap was subject to heavy bombardment. Major John Munro, Brigade Major RA, recalls visiting West Group HQ during a truce in the morning of 25 December.
After considerable search I found West Group HQ in a culvert under Lugard Road. Crowe had been shelled out of three houses where he had established his HQ. (Diary of Major Monro held at Imperial War Museum)
The Crown Colony capitulated in the early afternoon of 25 December 1941. The surrendered troops were corralled at various locations, but mostly around Victoria Barracks. A few days later they were incarcerated in POW camps at Sham Shui Po, Argyle Street and North Point. Captain Allanson may have initially entered Sham Shui Po Camp, but if so, a few months later, during April 1942, he was transferred to Argyle Street Camp, which became designated as an officer's camp.
   Allanson is variously referred to as 2/Lt,  Lt, and Captain. There is a reference to him acting as prosecution officer in the rank of Temporary Captain in mid-1941. He would have been a very suitable candidate for such a role given his legal background. He then appears to have reverted to his substantive rank on returning to his duties with 8th Coast Regiment. At some stage, he was promoted to the rank of Captain. MoD files (Forces-War-Records.co.uk) and Commonwealth War Graves Commission records (CWGC.org) all accord him the rank of Captain. He may have been promoted on transfer to 3rd Medium Battery where he took command of the Sai Wan 6-inch howitzer section,  or on Joining Major Duncan in re-establishing West Group, RA. West Group HQ had been destroyed at Wong Nai Chung Gap on 19 December 1941. It is also possible that he was promoted to Captain during his incarceration in POW camps (Dec 1941 to September 1942). However, I suspect it was more likely to have been during the battle as he took on increasing responsibility. 
   In September 1942, Captain Allanson was one of approximately 1,800 POWs who were to be transferred to Japan to work as slave labourers at docks, mines and factories. The POWs were taken on-board a Japanese freighter, the Lisbon Maru, which sailed from Hong Kong on 27 September 1942. 

The freighter Lisbon Maru (Source: Wikipedia)
The vessel was armed fore and aft and displayed no markings to indicate that POWs were aboard. In addition to the POWs, the Lisbon Maru carried 778 Japanese troops. The POWs were crowded into three holds. Captain Allanson together with 380 men of the Royal Artillery, under the command of Major William Pitt, 8th Coast Regiment, was allocated to No. 3 Hold. This was the stern-most of the three holds allocated to the POWs and was located aft of the bridge structure. The POWs were mostly sick with many suffering the effects of malnutrition, and others suffering from diphtheria, dysentery and malaria. The holds were overcrowded, filthy, rat-infested, and there were no sanitary or washing facilities provided for the POWs below deck.
   During the morning of 1 October, whilst approximately one hundred miles southeast of Shanghai, the ship was torpedoed by an American submarine, the USS Grouper. The submarine commander had no way of knowing that the Japanese freighter was carrying British POWs. The submarine fired six torpedoes, the fourth of which hit the freighter in her stern near the propeller shaft. The ship started taking on water and developed a list, but the old freighter took 24 hours to sink. The POWs were battened down in the holds. The air became musty and difficult to breathe, and without access to sanitation facilities, the conditions soon deteriorated. Since the freighter was slowly sinking by the stern, the No. 3 Hold was taking in the most water. A four-man water pump was lowered into the hold, and Captain Allanson helped to operate the pump.
   The Japanese escort vessels tried to tow the sinking ship but to no avail. By the morning of 2 October, it became obvious that the ship was going down, and would sink at any time. The Japanese soldiers had already been taken off, leaving a number of the crew and some armed guards. The Japanese were prepared to let the ship sink with the POWs trapped in the holds. When it became clear that the ship was going down, the men in No. 2 Hold managed to break out and release the covers on the two other holds. Many of the POWs were shot as they came out on the deck. Many jumped over the ship's side and started swimming away from the stricken vessel, but a number of these men were shot whilst in the water. It was only after Chinese fishermen, from nearby islands, had started picking up survivors that the Japanese did the same. Some 800 British POWs lost their lives, including Captain Allanson who was subsequently reported as missing, believed drowned. The No. 3 Hold, which had taken in so much water, had the highest number of casualties from drowning.
   After the war, one of the survivors of the sinking, who had been in the same hold, visited Kenneth's widowed mother, Dora Maude Allanson, and told her that Kenneth had manned the pumps to the end. In helping to save others, he gave up his life. He was remembered by Battery Quartermaster Sergeant Charles Barman, HKSRA, who kept a diary, and who had been in Argyle Street Camp with   Kenneth Allanson.
I heard yesterday that Lieut Allanson of the 8th Coast Regiment was one of the unfortunates to go down when the Lisbon Maru was sunk last year, he was an excellent officer. (Resist to the End (2009) Charles Barman).
.....................



KEA visiting his sister in South Africa - Aug/Sept 1940 (Courtesy Christopher Allanson)

In happier times (Courtesy Christopher Allanson)

Acknowledgements:
My special thanks to Christopher Allanson, whose own father, James Allanson, served in the 51st Highland Division in North Africa and Italy. Kenneth was James Allanson's youngest brother. 

Information:
As usual, if anybody can add to this story, or provide more information on Captain Kenneth Allanson, please do so by commenting on the post, or by contacting the writer. 

Lisbon Maru:
The full story of the sinking can be read in Tony Banham's book The Sinking of the Lisbon Maru - Britain's Forgotten Wartime Tragedy (2006).

Royal Artillery Glossary:
Troop:   Refers to a unit of 4 guns. A Field Regiment normally had three Batteries and each Battery had two Troops.
Section: Refers to a unit of fewer than 4 guns (usually 2 and therefore a half Troop). Sections were sometimes designated Left and Right Sections.

  





Friday, 1 June 2018

The Tai Wai Bunkers

One of my Facebook (FB)  friends, Kei Fu, posted a  message on the FB site "Battle of Hong Kong" showing a contour map with a location point labelled the "Tai Wai Bunkers." In his post, he was wondering how to get access to these bunkers which had become incorporated into a major building site. The development which will be a 15-storey residential apartment block will be called The Met.Acapella. The artist's impression shows a very attractive development close to the amenities of Tai Wai and surrounded by the hills and countryside. Another FB friend, Victor Li, helped to pinpoint the location with photographs and map extracts. Kwong Chi-man, a professor of history, advised on the FB site that he had been in contact with the Civil Engineering & Development Dept (CEDD) and Antiquities and Monuments Office (AMO) regarding the importance of protecting these WW2 bunkers. Chi-man posted a photograph which showed a very substantial bunker ("the long bunker"). I had not heard of these bunkers before, but immediately wondered given the size of the long bunker and the presence of four other splinter-proof shelters, and the proximity to Tai Po Road, whether this could be the site of the Advanced Battalion HQ of the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Punjab Regiment.  The battalion was commanded by Lt-Col Gerald Ralph Kidd who was killed in action during the fighting at Shouson Hill on the Island.
There were three possibilities as to who may have occupied these surviving WW2 military structures:

1. Advanced Bn HQ 2/14 Punjab Regt.

2. 'D' Coy HQ 2/14 Punjab Regt

3. Battery HQ for the forward guns of the Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery (HKSRA) which were positioned in Tai Wai locality.

Any of these three usages are possibilities, and the site could have been a combination of any two, or even all three.
On the declaration of a State of Emergency on Sunday 7 December 1941, six howitzers were deployed to forward locations in the vicinity of Tai Wai. These included two 3.7-inch and two 4.5-inch howitzers from 2nd Mountain Battery, and two 6-inch howitzers from 25th Medium Battery. The two 3.7-inch guns were transported by pack mules and were probably positioned furthest forward. The 4.5 and 6-inch guns needed to be towed by lorries and would, therefore, have been deployed close to the Tai Po Road. Other guns (3.7-inch howitzers) were deployed at Customs Pass, on the right flank of the Gin Drinkers Line (GDL), whilst others were positioned to the rear of the GDL at Main Filters, located at the southern end of Tai Po Road,  and the Polo Ground near Prince Edward Road. Nearby AOPs were manned at Sandal Wood, Crown Point, Golden Hill, Shing Mun Redoubt, Texaco Peninsula and Crown Point. Mainland Royal Artillery had their HQ in splinter-proof shelters adjacent to those occupied by Mainland (Kowloon) Infantry Brigade at the northern end of Waterloo Road. 
The map extract from the wartime map below shows the 5 1/2, 6 1/2 and 7 1/2 milestones (MS) along the Tai Po Road. It also shows the approximate position of the Tai Wai Bunkers which seem to be located very close to the 7 1/2 MS at a point where the railway starts to curve southwards to the Beacon Hill Tunnel.  


The Mainland Brigade war diary, the Royal Artillery war diaries, and the 2/14 Punjab war diary make no mention of the exact location of Battalion HQ, or 'D' Coy HQ or Forward Batteries RA HQ.  'D' Coy 2/14 Punjab Regt was occupying the left flank of the Punjab sector from Tai Po Road towards Shatin Pass. When the evacuation (of troops and guns) on the Mainland began on Thursday 11 December 1941, Captain David Mathers, commanding 'D' Coy, 2/14 Punjab Regt writes in the battalion war diary section pertaining to 'D' Coy that the company was was ordered to RV at the 5 1/2 MS. From the 5 1/2 MS, they took the catch water path which is marked in white on the map above. This might suggest that 'D' Coy HQ was located closer to the 5 1/2 MS.
At 1100 hours on 11 December, 'D' Coy's forward troops fired their Boys anti-tank rifles at two Japanese light tanks seen on Tai Po Road near the Shatin level-crossing which were probing the Punjab defences.
11 December 1215 hours:
"Last troops left forward positions. I met the CO at Advanced Battalion HQ and proceeded to 5 1/2 MS. On arrival found that 'D' Coy had been posted in position above the catchment. Spent next four hours walking along the catchment, up Railway Pass, round Beacon Hill locating Coy positions."
11 December 1830 hours:
"Withdrew Coy along the catchment up Shatin Pass, down Jats Incline to Devil's Peak Pier."
We know that Rear Bn HQ commanded by Lt James Flynn was located at Whitfield Barracks in Kowloon.  The Advanced Bn HQ was on or close to Tai Po Road, but was it at the Tai Wai Bunkers which were close to the 7 1/2 MS or was there another set of bunkers at the 6 1/2 MS now demolished?  The reason for posing this question is that the Diary of Events for Rear Bn HQ written by Lt James Flynn refers to the 6 1/2 MS HQ
10 December 2400 hours:
"Reported to CO at 6 1/2 MS HQ".
This could be an error, and perhaps the 7 1/2 MS was meant, but this seems unlikely. We are then back to the possibility of there once having been more military structures at the 6 1/2 MS. The 6 1/2 MS must have been close to where Shatin Heights is now situated. At the 7 1/2 MS, there is a small park named after the milestone and in which there is a replica of the 7 1/2 MS. 
            
71/2 MS Rest Garden
Replica of MS
The building site for The Met.Acapella is a short distance from the replica MS. I wanted to see these shelters, but the problem arose as to how to get there. I would not be allowed to walk into the building site without permission and without supervision and health and safety requirements like a  hard-hat, but I thought I might be able to reach the bunkers from the hillside above. So I trekked up the road leading to the Po Leung Kuk hospital located at the end of a cul-de-sac and overlooking the building site. I explained to the security guard that I was hiking down the hill from outside the perimeter fence. I then proceeded to work my way around the outside of the permitter fence until I reached a pylon a little way down the slope. I passed under the pylon and made my way downhill and slightly to the right. The undergrowth was not too thick and the slope was not too steep and by holding onto the trees I was able to make my way down to building site.

Source: Po Leung Kok YC Cheng Centre web site
I emerged above the building site and to the rear of the site. The slope had been protected by slope work and a large steel wire netted fence had been erected to catch any rock-fall. 

My route from the hospital to the back of the building site 
I spent some time going along the lower slope expecting to find the bunkers but soon realised the only way to see them was to get into the building site. I entered the site at the rear and made my way past the swimming pool, which was under construction and followed the northern perimeter of the building site where I found the string of WW2 bunkers. 

Splinter-proof shelter
The same shelter looking west towards the rear of the site 
The long bunker looking east towards the entrance to the site 
Entrance portals at the long bunker 
The long bunker looking west towards the rear of the site
Entrance to one of the splinter-proof shelters
Standard design splinter-proof shelter at the site. 
Set of two splinter-proofs 
Since I was in a building site without permission - I took photographs hurriedly and walked out the main entrance of the site. Nobody questioned me and it was preferable to walk out the main entrance than retrace my path up the hill to the Po Leung Kuk hospital facility. After I posted my photos on FB Battle of Hong Kong site a number of other photos were posted showing the Tai Wai bunkers in better condition, and including some internal photos of the bunkers taken before the area became a building site. The long bunker had two or three portals but no apertures. The splinter-proof shelters had apertures that had been bricked up. 
Rob Weir, who specialises in Hong Kong's WW2 fixed defences,  informed me that the site was used at one time during the 1960s/1970s as a Riding School. Victor Li advised me that before and during the war the site was known as the Kai Kee Farm.

Damaged map showing four sets of splinter proofs and the long bunker (Courtesy: Victor Li)
The map extract above shows the former Shatin Riding School, and the set of four splinter proofs (labelled Bunker No. 2), and the long bunker (labelled Bunker No. 1). Sometime after I published the first edition of this blog I was contacted by Geoffrey Lam whose grandfather ran the Shatin Riding School in the period from the 1960s  until the 1990s. Geoffrey described it as an orchard and riding school. He sent me family snaps showing the swimming pool with the bunkers in the background and a black-white showing the whole site of the riding school adjacent to Tai Po Road.

The Shatin Riding School (courtesy of Geoffry Lam)
The illustration of the site below, looking south, is taken from the online marketing brochure for the development.

The Met.Acapella
The red line, marked on the photo above, shows the approximate line of bunkers. The major concern of history enthusiasts is that the bunkers, which are already overgrown and dilapidated, are likely to be further damaged due to the proximity of a major construction site. The only way to see the bunkers now is from the building site. When the building is completed there is concern about public accessibility. I suspect these bunkers will be very inaccessible and neglected in future. Colin Blackwell posted a copy of the Summary of the Land Grant which requires the developer not to damage the military structures.
   There is still a question mark as to who used these bunkers. Was it the site of the Forward Artillery, was it Advanced Bn HQ for 2/14 Punjab Rgt, or was it HQ for 'D' Coy 2/14th Punjab Regt, or a combination of the three. To many people, and perhaps to some of the future residents of the Met.Acapella, these are just unsightly ruins, but to an increasing number of people, these are seen as a precious link to our wartime history and the defence of Hong Kong in December 1941. They are historic buildings and they deserve to be better cared for.


Addendum:

Sometime after writing this post I heard about another military bunker on Tai Po road still extant but converted into a two-storey dwelling presumably by squatters. The location is at Luk Hop Village (see photo below) opposite the bus stop. When I visited there was nobody around, but there were some mean looking dogs that prevented me from taking a closer investigation. There is at least one WW2 type splinter-proof shelter evident but there may have been a cluster of two or more. If a single shelter - it could have been a Platoon HQ or Coy HQ for 2/14 Punjabs. If it is a cluster of two or more then possibly 'D' Coy HQ or battalion HQ.


A splinter-proof shelter with a storey added on top

The bus stop opposite the splinter-proof

Continuing along Tai Po Road towards Lai Chi Lok. I came across a simi-circular array of WW2 type splinter-proof structures. These were being used as (light) explosives storage by the HK Government.  The structures were fenced off and guarded and I was unable to get a close look. A notice board showed that the facility was operated by Mines Dept.




I posted the photos on FaceBook community for Battle of Hong Kong. Guy Bridges responded:
That is Kowloon Explosives Depot, operated by Mines Division of the CEDD. I believe it was a former military magazine dating back well before WWII. Currently used to store small quantities of pyrotechnics for the film industry, and emergency storage of confiscated explosives.
If these were constructed pre-war - could they have been the Bn HQ for 2/14 Punjabs? Clive Franks posted a message as below:
As well as eight storage bunkers, there is an administrative building. The complex was originally built by the British military in the mid 1930's for storage of a variety of explosives. It was handed over post WW2 for civilian use for storage of industrial explosives. More recently used for storage of professional fireworks and pyrotechnics.
Some others stated that the magazines were post-war. The wartime map shown below shows the first and second positions of Bn HQ 2/RS,  but more interestingly appears to show 2/14 Punjab Bn HQ at the 6 1/2 MS  at about the location of the bunkers at Luk Hop Village. It is a continuing mystery as to who occupied the Tai Wai Bunkers, the Luk Hop Village bunkers and the government magazines assuming that the latter was a pre-war construction.

West Flank - GDL  

6 1/2 Milestone 
I am inclined, for the time being, to think that the Tai Wai bunkers were RA Mainland Forward HQ and that the bunkers at Luk Hop Village were 2/14 Punjab  Bn HQ and that the Govt Magazines were post war structures and did not exist in 1941.




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Acknowledgements:

Colin Blackwell
Kei Fu
Kwong, Chi Man
Geoffrey Lam
Victor Li








Tuesday, 1 May 2018

Group Captain Thomas Horry Commanding Officer RAF Kai Tak

Thomas Stanley Thorpe Horry was born in Boston, Lincolnshire on 21 May 1898. He was the Commanding Officer of the RAF station at Kai Tak before the start of the Battle for Hong Kong. At about this time, he was given a new assignment with RAF, Singapore and left Hong Kong on the ill-fated SS Ulysses, bound for Singapore by way of Manila. He handed over command of the RAF station in Hong Kong to Wing Commander Humphrey ('Ginger') Sullivan. He had a farewell function on Saturday and left for Singapore on Sunday 7 December. The next day Japan attacked Hong Kong, Malaya, Philippines and the US Fleet at Pearl Harbour and the Pacific War began.

Wing Commander Horry - third from right - Hong Kong 1941 (Source: IWM)

There is a reference to Horry in Major Munro's private papers held at the Imperial War Museum. John Monro was Brigade Major, Royal Artillery, based at the military HQ known as China Command or referred to as the Battle Box. On Saturday 6 December, Monro had gone to Kai Tak for a flying lesson. His instructor was Pilot Officer N.L. Baugh, RAF.
I thought it went rather well and was very disappointed with Baugh for not letting me go solo. After it got dark we went into the bar and met some of the CNAC pilots. They had about a dozen planes leaving for Nam Yeung that night. The first two Douglasses went off at about 7:15 and were expected back shortly after 9 pm. Baugh and I intended going out together to dine. First of all we went up to his mess for a wash. When we got there we found there was a flap in progress. A message had just been received from RAF Singapore putting them on a No. 1 state of readiness. "Horrid" Horry rang up Newman [GSO-1 at China Command] to find out if he had heard any further news, but was told that headquarters far from having had any fresh cause of alarm, were thinking of relaxing their precautions. There was an air of expectancy and excitement in the mess where I stayed to dinner as Baugh was now confined to barracks. As I went home after dinner everything seemed quiet and normal. There were the usual Saturday night crowds in the main streets and on the ferries. Hong Kong was illuminated as usual. This morning  [Sunday 7th December] when I went to the office, I found the situation had worsened. I don't really believe that anyone thinks that it will come to anything. We have had so many flaps and lived in a state of tension for so long that we have become blasé. We live only for the day when the rather annoying precautions that interfere with our private amusements are once more considered unnecessary. (IWM Doc. 17941)
Group Captain Horry was probably not sorry to be leaving Hong Kong. The RAF station only possessed five aircraft all of which were obsolete and were no match for Japanese aircraft. The RAF station consisted of seven officers and sixty men. Another RAF officer, a Japanese linguist, Alf Bennett, was based at HQ China Command located in the Battle Box. There had been plans for a squadron of Buffalo Brewsters to be sent from Singapore to augment the three RAF Vildebeests and two Walrus amphibians.  An officer had been sent from Singapore to help establish the fighter control room in preparation for this reinforcement. Most of the RAF aircraft and several civil aircraft were destroyed during the first air raids on the first day of the battle. The RAF aircraft played no part in the fighting, they never got off the ground and their loss made no difference to the outcome of the battle. 
   On the first day out of Hong Kong, whilst Ulysses was on passage to Manila, Captain James Russell heard on the ship's radio that war had begun, and that Manila was already under attack. He ordered the ship to turn south and head for Singapore. She was spotted by Japanese aircraft and bombed and strafed on two different occasions. The ship reached Singapore and sailed on to Australia and then through the Panama Canal and was later sunk by a U-Boat off the coast of South Carolina. I have always assumed that Group Captain Horry disembarked at Singapore to take up his new assignment. I have not been able to discover what that assignment was, or what became of him during the battle. It is not clear whether he became a POW after the Fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 or whether he was able to get out of Singapore with other RAF personnel and aircraft to the Dutch East Indies. See further elaboration on this in the concluding paragraph below.
   In conducting research and trying to find out more about him I discovered that Thomas Horry had fought in WW1, and that in 1917, aged nineteen, he had obtained the Aviators Certificate issued by the Royal Aero Club, a prerequisite for Army Officers, or others, wanting to join the Royal Flying Corps. Further research confirmed that he had been an 'Ace' and that he had been accredited with eight 'kills' in the last month of WW1. 

Fl Lt Thomas Horry 1917

He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) in 1919. The citation reads:
An officer of exceptional courage and daring. In the face of driving rain and low clouds, he led his patrol into enemy territory in order to engage enemy troops and transport that were retiring. Reaching his objective he attacked the enemy with  vigour, causing heavy casualties. He has in all destroyed three enemy aircraft and driven down another, out of control, and has, in addition, taken a leading part in the destruction of six others.
He remained in the  Royal Air Force, the successor to the Royal Flying Corps, and was awarded the Air Force Cross (AFC) in 1928. But what of his personal life? I was not able to find out much except that he married at the age of thirty-seven to Lola Erben, aged thirty-four, in March 1936. It was her second marriage and as far as I could see there were no children from either marriage. Horry died at the early age of sixty-one in 1960. Lola lived on until 1991 when she passed away in Victoria, Australia aged ninety, thirty years after her husband had died. A man who had fought in two world wars, a WW1 Ace, the holder of the DFC and the AFC, who had served in Hong Kong on the eve of battle and in the defence of Singapore during the battle.

The mystery referred to above is that we don't know what happened to Horry after leaving Hong Kong. Did he get off the Ulysses when it docked at Singapore. I would think so because he had his orders but there is a possibility that for whatever reason (for example orders rescinded or changed) he stayed aboard and continued to Australia ........... but I think this is unlikely. I had always previously assumed that he had disembarked at Singapore, taken up his new role, and been captured and interned as a POW. However this may not be the case. I am grateful to Ken Hornett for getting in touch with me and sharing some of his research. He found no record of Horry being a POW in Singapore and found a retirement notice for him posted in the London Gazette in November 1944. Horry must have been in the UK in 1944 and of ofcourse Singapore was not liberated until August/September 1945. My theory is that he left Singapore during the battle with evacuating RAF personnel and aircraft bound for Sumatra and later Java in the Dutch East Indies. From there he must have somehow managed to reach Australia or Ceylon before returning to the UK. Of course this is conjecture but it seems a plausible explanation. Ken Hornett advised that Horry and his wife Lola took passage on SS Corfu to Singapore in 1938, then continuing to Hong Kong to take up command of the RAF station at Kai Tak. It is likely that Lola would have been evacuated to Australia in July 1940 under the requirement of the Compulsory Evacuation order for British women and children in Hong Kong but there is no record of this. It is possible she left earlier at her own expense. She was not in Hong Kong during the battle in December 1941.  Tony Banham discovered that Lola remarried in Australia after Thomas Horry died.

The answers must be out there somewhere and as usual I would be grateful for any further information from readers as to what befell Thomas and Lola Horry, before,  during and after the Battle for Singapore and how he returned to UK after leaving Hong Kong on one of the last ships out.


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Addendum: 
Horry had a brother William Horry (1895-1939) and a sister, Norah Horry (dates unknown) married George Holland from Boston Lincolnshire in November 1915. Thomas and William Horry both boarded at Caistor Grammar School in Market Rasen, Lincolnshire. It is likely that before this they attended De Aston School also in Market Rasen. Thomas Horry married Lola Erban in March 1936  in Kensington, London. Her first husband was Leonard John Pomeray Tremlett who died in 1938. Thomas Horry died in Harrogate, Yorkshire in 1960. Lola was still living in Harrogate in 1961 but may have moved to Australia after her husband's death. She died in Victoria, Australia in 1991.


RAF Officer Cadre in Hong Kong
Commanding Officer:
Group Captain Thomas Horry (until 7/12/41)
Wing Commander Humphrey ('Ginger') Sullivan (assumed command 7/12/41)

HQ China Command (Intelligence Section):
Wing Commander Hubert Thomas ('Alf') Bennett

Pilots:
Squadron Leader Donald Hill
Flt. Lt Hector Bertram ('Dolly') Gray
Flying Officer Norman Lee ('Whimpey') Baugh
Pilot Officer   ('Junior') Crossley

Adjutant:
Pilot Officer Fred ('Horse' or 'Colonel') Thomson

Special Duty - sent from Singapore to help set up fighter operations room:
Pilot Officer Francis Peter Hennessy


Acknowledgements:
Tony Banham
Ken Hornett

Monday, 16 April 2018

Major John Johnstone ("JJ") Paterson

JJ Paterson was born in 1886 at St. Andrews, Edinburgh, Scotland. He was the oldest son of William Paterson (1844-1914), a partner in the trading company Jardine Matheson, which had commenced business on the China Coast in 1832 and later became known as the "Princely Hong." Hong being the name given to the large trading companies operating out of Canton and later Hong Kong. William Paterson was a descendant of William Jardine's sister Jean. William Paterson passed away in 1914. His son, JJ Paterson, served in the County of London (Westminster Dragoons), a Territorial Army unit, and in the Camel Corps during WW1. He had marched into Baghdad with General Allenby, had been promoted from Sergeant to Lt, and had been Mentioned in Despatches (MiD) six times.  After completing his military service, JJ joined Jardines in 1919. He married in 1926, aged thirty-nine, to Marjorie Hyland, aged twenty-nine, an American lady from California. The marriage took place in Jiangsu, China. 

By the early 1930's he had risen to become Managing Director, or Taipan, of Jardine Matheson. He was Chairman of Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation on three occasions between 1932 and 1941.  Throughout the 1930s he served as Member of the Legislative Council (LEGCO), and from 1936, as a Member of the Executive Council (EXCO). 

JJ Paterson (Source: Wikipedia and "The Thistle and the Jade"
He had a large bungalow in Fan Ling from where he could enjoy his passion for shooting and for playing golf. On weekends he would host house parties. Emily Hahn, writing in China to Me (1944) describes one such house party. 
"Charles (Boxer) and I went out for a weekend to J.J. Paterson's place at Fan Ling. ... JJ is a famous taipan who had been in China all his life, and who preferred to live miles from town. ... He is a large red-faced man with a sense of humour well above the average. Once in a while, when his chosen mode of living all alone palled on him, he sent out invitations to everyone he liked, and had a real bang-up party."
In 1941, aged fifty-five, he commanded a special guard unit of the HKVDC whose war station was to defend the Hong Kong Electric power station at North Point. The unit was known as the Hughes Group or the Hughesliers after their founder A. W. Hughes. The unit recruited predominantly from members of the British business community who were over the combatant age limit of fifty-five. Many of them had seen service in WW1 and in the Boer War. The oldest of this unit to be killed was Private Sir Edward De Voeux who was killed in action aged seventy-seven. The defenders from the Hughes Group, together with a handful of Rajputs and the survivors of a mobile platoon from 1/Mx fought off units from two battalions of Japanese infantry that had landed in the North Point area on Thursday night 18th December. The garrison had been subjected to aerial bombing and point-blank artillery fire, but held out until the afternoon of Friday 19th December 1941. JJ was held initially in North Point Camp and then Argyle Street Camp and later Sham Shui Po Camp. He survived the brutal incarceration, and after the war, in 1947, he retired to Kenya. He passed away in Nairobi in 1971, and his wife Marjorie passed away the following year. He received an MiD for his actions at North Point. His seventh MiD.

Colonel Shoji commanding 230th Infantry Regiment landed to the east of North Point. His troops picketed the power station and moved inland establishing an HQ at what Shoji described as a large lake, but which was, in fact, Braemar Reservoir. The site is now occupied by Braemar Hill Mansions and is close to the Chinese International School. From here, during the early hours of Friday 19th,  Shoji's two battalions set out along Sir Cecil's Ride for Wong Nai Chung Gap ......and a date with destiny.


North Point (with Braemar Reservoir top right) 

Artillery fire directed at the HKE power station at point blank range

The HKE power station at North Point.

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Sunday, 15 April 2018

Lt-Col Eustace Levett, Chief Signals Officer - China Command

Eustace Oliver Levett was born 6 June 1893 near Thetford in Norfolk. His family later moved to Sussex. He joined the Territorial Army at the age of seventeen in 1910. In 1913, he transferred to the Regular Army serving as a Private with the Army Ordnance Corps (AOC). On the outbreak of WW1 he was posted to France. He transferred from AOC to the infantry serving with the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards. In 1917, he was selected to undertake officer training. After having been commissioned as a subaltern, he was posted to the Royal Sussex Regiment, and returned to the Western Front. He was taken prisoner in March 1918, and was incarcerated until the Armistice in November 1918. He remained in the Army after WW1 serving with the British Army of Occupation on the Rhine. He transferred to the Royal Corps of Signals (RCS) when it was established in 1920. The Royal Corps of Signals can trace its origins back to 1870 when a Telegraph Troop, known as 'C' Troop, was formed as part of the Royal Engineers. They were responsible for communications by telegraph, visual signalling and despatch riding, initially by horse and later by motorcycle.

Dispatch Rider
Laying field telephone cable
 Field Telephone Exchange from No. 1 Coy HKVDC HQ at Taitam Bungalow
(Courtesy: Dave Willott)
Levett served in India from 1924 until 1929, after which he returned to Britain.  He was posted to Hong Kong in 1937, and in 1940 he was promoted to Chief Signals Officer, China Command. In this capacity, during the fighting in December 1941, he served with Major-General Maltby and other General Staff Officers (GSOs) in the deep underground bunker that was known as the battle box.

He married twice. Firstly, in 1919, to Bertha Winifred Lockwood (1894-1962) who predeceased him, and secondly in 1966, to Hilda Mona Worthington Newton (1903-1994). Eustace and Bertha had two sons one born in 1926, and the other born in 1935. Bertha and her youngest son, six-year-old John Kay Levett, were evacuated from Hong Kong to Australia in July 1940.

Levett was awarded the OBE (Military) in 1945. He retired from the Army in 1946, aged 53, after thirty years service. He had served in both world wars and had been a prisoner of war in each. After retiring from military service he then became a Bursar at a school in Eastbourne. He retired aged 65 in 1958. He passed away, aged 79,  in Eastbourne in 1972. He was recommended for the OBE by Major-General Maltby. Whose citation was as follows:
"Outstanding ability in organising and controlling the Royal Corps of Signals during a very tense period. Damage caused by enemy shell fire, mortars and air bombardment was severe and incessant yet repairs were always carried out and no call made on the Corps was ever disregarded or unaccomplished. He was always cool, cheerful and prepared to undertake  at short notice any demand upon him. His personal example was an inspiration to his whole Corps."
His private war diary, and a type-written memoir, is held at the Imperial War Museum in London. The personal diary was compiled whilst he was a POW in Sham Shui Po and Argyle Street Camps. The cover is made from a khaki drill (KD) shirt. The diary and memoir were given, after his death, to his former comrade in arms, Lt-Col Montague Truscott, RCS, by his widow Mrs Hilda Mona Levett. The Truscott family must have passed it to the Imperial War Museum. The diary has a hand-drawn emblem of the symbol for Yin and Yang. Underneath the symbol he has written the following lines:
"And when the great scorer comes
To mark against your name
He cares not whether you won or lost
But how you played the game."
I viewed the official war diary at the Royal Signals Museum in Blandford Camp, Dorset.  I got the impression that Lt-Col  Levett was a popular officer, a sympathetic man who cared for his men and demonstrated strong leadership.

At the outbreak of war on 8th December 1941, the Royal Corps of Signals were comprised of 6 officers, 175 Other Ranks (ORs), augmented by 33 Canadian Signallers and 15 Volunteers and 96 civilian linesmen.


Chief Signals Officer:                   Lt-Col Eustace Levett

Hong Kong Signals Company

O.C. Company:                             Major Leonard Hayes
No. 1 Operating Section:              Lt Cyril Bucke
No. 2 Maintenance Section:         Lt Harry Spong
No. 3 Infantry Brigade Section:   Lt Charles Brown
No. 4 Section:                               Sgt. George Somerville
Area Signals Officer:                    Captain Peter Gracey


Total:       6  Officers, 175 ORs, and 96 civilian employees.
   

Kowloon Infantry Brigade Signals Section

OC Section:                                   Captain George Billings


Total:        1 Officer and 32 ORs (Canadian Signals)


Fortress Signals Coy - HKVDC

OC Company:                                 Major John Sherry
2 i/c                                                 Captain Walter Clark

Total:         2 Officers, 26 ORs

The Royal Corps of Signals had a very high casualty rate with more than 97 men either killed in action or died of wounds or died during incarceration.  A 54% death rate. The Canadian detachment lost 9 killed out of 33 All Ranks. A 27% death rate. The HKVDC (Signals Section) lost 6 men killed (a 21% death rate). The Hong Kong Signals Coy lost 50 men killed in the sinking of the Lisbon Maru.

Communications is the lifeblood in battle, without effective communications there is only chaos, confusion, and individual actions by units. Although there were some wireless communications, most communication was by telephone with cables usually laid in a ditch or a shallow trench. In battle conditions, the cable would be laid along the ground. The telephone cable was easily broken by artillery, mortar and aerial bombing. When this happened linesmen were sent out to repair the cables which often had to be done under fire. Without telephone-communications commanders had to revert to runners and dispatch riders, who were often killed before they could deliver a message.



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